THE NATION

OCTOBER 15, 1960 . . 25c

TWO CHEERS FOR KENNEDY

An Editorial

CONGO AND EMERGENT AFRICA

Henry L. Bretton

MONEY IN POLITICS

Review by Earl Latham

THE CANDIDATES and FOREIGN POLICY

J. David Singer

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LETTERS

And Now What?

Dear Sirs: In his article, "The Added Witness," in your Oct. 1 issue, George T. Altman raises far more than new doubts on the Hiss case. . . . In the celebrated Dreyfus case, justice was eventually done. But what is to be done in the Hiss case if the analysis presented in the article is sound? If the second trial of Alger Hiss was unfair—and what other conclusion is possible in the light of Mr. Altman's monograph?—a virtual empire of ambition is revealed to rest upon dishonest proceedings, unethical actions by many highly placed individuals in the Government of the United States, and a cynical and dangerous playing upon public fears of Communist subversion.

When men in positions of public trust appear to have abused their power to serve personal ambition, the "rottenness" in Denmark is both wide and deep. The charge of "twenty years of treason," heard in the land seven years ago, is, by this article, made into a two-edged sword. . . .

DAVID P. LEONARD

South Hadley, Mass.

Steve Allen Fights Back

Dear Sirs: Having read your editorial [Sept. 17 issue] on the Warner and Swasey advertisement which appeared in the Sept. 12 *Newsweek*, I thought you might be interested in the following letter which I addressed to Walter K. Bailey, president of the company:

" . . . Permit me to outline my objections [to the advertisement]:

"1. Statements such as 'Yes, there is something worse than an atom bomb; the abject fear of it' are not the sort, unfortunately, that are meaningful enough to be either proved or disproved. . . .

"2. You say 'Fear of Russia's nuclear bombs and missiles has turned too many Americans into cowards and appeasers.' . . . For the past couple of years I have devoted a great deal of my time and energy to trying to rally popular support for the official U. S. nuclear policy (as contrasted with the Teller-Dodd policy) [and] I am in a position to [state] that my co-workers in this cause are neither cowards nor appeasers. Robert Ryan, my co-chairman in the Hollywood branch of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, is an Irishman, an ex-Marine and an ex-boxer; I do not advise your copy chief to repeat the accusation of cowardice or appeasement in his presence. Nor, frankly, in my own. . . .

"3. 'Give me liberty or give me death,' you quote. Beautiful words, indeed. . . . But the basic question today is: Has a man the moral right to commit to his own funeral pyre hundreds of millions of people all over the world who were not consulted about his choice and who want to go on living?

"4. You say, 'The courage of character can make us safer than all the shelters in the world. . . . ' I agree fully. But I do not see that our self-respect can be enhanced by a dependence on weapons that would subject millions of innocent civilians all over the world to incineration.

"Then what way out, you ask? The way that our negotiators at Geneva have sought. The way to some form of international control of nuclear weapons . . . guaranteed by mutual inspection every step of the way. . . ."

STEVE ALLEN

Hollywood, Calif.

No Right to Criticize?

Dear Sirs: I would like to draw your attention to an interesting aspect of the review of Albert Van Nostrand's book, *The Denatured Novel,* by Mr. Emile Capouya [issue of Oct. 1]. In it, Mr. Capouya expresses views about the forces influencing and shaping modern fiction which are only a little less absolute than those held by Mr. Van Nostrand. It is remarkable, at least I find it so, that neither party to the argument should have published a novel. Mr. Capouya seems to me to be insolent when he speaks of the vacuousness of the work of Mr. Paul Bowles. Whatever the defects of Mr. Bowles's work may be, it at least exists; Mr. Capouya's does not. I also find it very disagreeable to see Mr. Capouya writing patronizingly of Mr. John O'Hara's first novel and with contempt of the remainder of his work. Mr. O'Hara has been involved in a long and honorable struggle, the nature of which is immediately apparent to anyone who understands the nature of the creative process. I believe . . . that one of the more disgusting aspects of the literary scene at the moment is that so many wholly uncreative and unproductive persons have usurped a place upon it.

ANTHONY WEST

New York City

The Nation on FM

Readers in the New York area may hear the next installment of *The Nation Commentary on* Oct. 11 at 7 P.M. over WBAI-FM (99.5). Milton R. Wessel, former chief of a U.S. Department of Justice special task force on organized crime, will discuss Fred J. Cook's "Gambling, Inc.," to which the entire *Nation* issue of Oct. 22 will be devoted.

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1960
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THE NATION

EDITORIALS

Two Cheers for Kennedy

SELDOM HAS *The Nation* been confronted with less satisfactory alternatives than in this year's election. In advance of the primaries and the conventions, we formulated a statement in terms of which we proposed to test candidates and parties ("The Candidates and a Politics of Peace," February 6, 1960). The paramount concern, we said, was peace; the key issues, we suggested, were those related to "a politics of peace." Three specific issues were added — China, civil rights, civil liberties — more or less as a test of the courage, candor and intellectual integrity of the candidates. Copies were sent to the candidates before the conventions and comments were invited; responses were received from all except Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy. As the campaign has unfolded, we have used the statement as a guide to editorial comment.

It turns out that neither candidate, neither party, advocates a politics of peace. Both Mr. Nixon and Senator Kennedy are dedicated to the continued pursuit of the cold-war policies of the postwar period. Neither has suggested that there is anything wrong with the general direction of American foreign policy; neither has suggested that it might be desirable to work out a *modus vivendi* with the USSR or stated the way this might be done. Vice President Nixon defends the record of the Administration in implementing cold-war policies and says he would do better; Senator Kennedy says he could do a lot, lot better. Both presumably would continue fighting the cold war to total victory; neither has defined "victory" nor indicated what sort of settlement other than unconditional surrender would be acceptable. Both would increase arms spending while seeking arms control; not only are these goals regarded as compatible, but both candidates feel that disarmament agreements can come only as a by-product of continued American military supremacy. Both adhere to the "negotiate-from-position-of-strength" dogma which, as interpreted by the Pentagon, assures an acceleration of the arms race.

Nor is there much difference between the candidates on the issues which we suggested might be used as a test of courage, candor and integrity. Both are opposed to the recognition of China or its admission to the U.N. Despite such damaging blows to American prestige as recent incidents involving Kenneth Tynan and Dr. Linus Pauling, neither the Vice President nor Senator Kennedy has suggested that the Congressional inquisitorial committees should be curbed or abolished; neither acknowledges the existence of civil liberties as an issue. On civil rights — the third of the "test" issues — the Democratic platform and the position of the Democratic nominee enjoy a margin of preference.

THE NATION'S yardstick was designed not to detect nuances but to ferret out genuine differences, if any, between the candidates on the necessity for a politics of peace. We did not believe that this election should be fought on the basis of whether another dam should be built on the Snake River or whether federal aid should be extended to teachers' salaries as well as school construction, or which of two inadequate plans offered the best hope of providing a measure of medical assistance for the aged. But even on issues other than those we selected, there is very little difference in the positions of the candidates. We are not impressed by the proposition that the main issue in the campaign is which of the candidates is "more sincere." Nor are we impressed by the proposition that a key difference between them is that one has "taste" and "style" while the other does not. Or that one is — or purports to be — less complacent than the other. Doubtless our own yardstick was less than perfect, but we prefer it to these.

Still the dilemma remains. New Nixon or old, the Vice President throughout his career has shown an almost compulsive propensity to throttle free debate and discussion whenever circumstances have made it possible and whenever it has served his interest and advantage. He has not, of course, advocated the suppression of free speech, but his methods have encouraged suppression. One does not need to ransack the files for examples; the current campaign will suffice. To imply that criticism of American foreign policy in the course of a Presidential election is to be avoided because it will "encourage

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Chairman Khrushchev and his fellow-dictators" is to exhibit the same contempt for the democratic process and the intelligence and good sense of American voters that has characterized the Vice President's political career from the outset. His consistent policy has been: never meet debate if you can stifle it. The Vice President's predilection for this ruthless method has been, perhaps, the most consistent aspect of his career; he has used it in the past, he has used it in this campaign, he will use it again. In the past, his adherence to this method has not resulted in irreparable damage; in the future, it might. For this reason if for no other, we would not want to see Mr. Nixon invested with the awesome powers of the Presidency. As President, his powers to foreclose debate (and therefore dissent) not merely in domestic affairs but also in international dealings — even with our Allies — would be very great indeed, and his record indicates he would not hesitate to use them.

In the circumstances, there is only one way to cast an effective protest vote against Nixon and that is to mark a ballot for Senator Kennedy. Not to vote would be tantamount to casting half-a-vote for the Vice President. We would like to register a protest at the polls against the demeaning character of the current campaign (see J. David Singer's comments in this issue, p. 245), but there is no way this can be done that would not redound to Mr. Nixon's advantage. If circumstances permitted, we would have registered a further protest by marking a separate ballot for Henry Cabot Lodge for Vice President. But this, of course, is not possible.

It is an unhappy position in which we find ourselves, but we have no intention of sulking about it or of "sitting this one out." The ballot is there to be used and we intend to use it, and to urge others to use it, to record a vote against Richard Nixon.

The source of our unhappiness with Senator Kennedy, incidentally, is not that Mr. Stevenson was passed over. The editors respect Mr. Stevenson — *The Nation* endorsed his candidacy in 1952 and again in 1956 — but we are not "disgruntled Stevensonians." Mr. Kennedy could brighten our spirits if between now and November 8 he would convince us that he is not just another cold warrior, if he would firm up his position on civil liberties and civil rights and, finally, if he would give unqualified endorsement to the foreign-policy views of Mr. Bowles and Mr. Stevenson.

But until then, two cheers for Kennedy.

Collective Bargaining, G.E.-Style

In the current strike of the International Union of Electrical Workers against the General Electric Company, the attitude of the company presents some novel features — novel, at least, in the context of recent decades. For the most part, corporation policy has been to rake in the profits at government and public expense and to divide the swag with organized labor, the actual proportions to be determined by tough, but real, collective bargaining. For reasons of its own, G. E. has adopted a fresh approach, explained at length in full-page advertisements which appeared in many newspapers on October 4. G. E. does not have a closed mind, says G. E., but "*there comes a point beyond which General Electric cannot go if it is to fulfill its responsibilities to customers, share owners, suppliers, vendors and other members of the public, as well as to employees.*" (Italics in original.) And: "While General Electric deplores this strike, we cannot and will not be forced by strike action to raise our offer past the point where the facts indicate that it must rest." The sole judge of the facts is, of course, G. E. itself. It will consult the balance sheet and its conscience (and perhaps one of its digital computers), make its offer and then stand fast. Furthermore, G. E., not any union, is the best judge of what is beneficial and what is detrimental to its work force: "General Electric and its employees would be damaged more by *yielding* to the union's irresponsible demands than by absorbing a long and unwanted strike." (Italics in original.) Although G. E. does an annual business of more than $4 billion, a sizable part of it in "defense," and employs 240,000 persons in 166 plants in 29 states, it insists that it can remain closed for a year, if necessary, without impairing the national economy; and it clearly implies that it is prepared to do just that.

G. E. makes it clear, also, that outside interference of any kind will not be tolerated. It has laid down its terms; federal or state mediation would only raise "false hopes" that it will relent. The only governmental interference G. E. welcomes — and this it not only welcomes but demands — is local police protection for those employees who choose to cross picket lines. "It has hinted," writes A. H. Raskin, the labor editor of *The New York Times*, "that any failure on the part of . . . communities to supply adequate protection to non-strikers will affect G.E.'s thinking on whether the company will move to other areas after the walkout." With an operation so far-flung, this is no idle threat.

The Nation does not pass any judgment on the merits of the dispute between General Electric and the union. But it does seem, on the basis of General Electric's own words, that its officers are confusing their functions with those of government. Toughness and megalomania may pay off in this case, for the I.U.E. represents only 70,000 of the company's workers and some of the locals appear seriously divided in their counsels. Even so, G. E. and the country might live to rue the day, if a G. E. victory inaugurated a period of get-tough-with-labor in which a domestic cold war would be superimposed on the existing foreign one.

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The Politics of Opposition

As often before, France today gives the world an example of dissidence in action. The lesson is that some must move too far before the mass of apolitical or apathetic citizens can be moved at all. The "dirty war" in Algeria, a kind of compulsive military operation, led to the trial by a military tribunal of twenty-six Frenchmen and Moslems accused of helping the Algerian rebel network in France. They are charged with distributing propaganda material and funds, and giving "shelter" to the rebels. In at least some instances, the charge is true: the accused proclaim their guilt and assert that they are fighting "Fascist" tendencies in France — they point to concentration-camp practices and torture by the French army in Algeria as a normal feature of its operations. In the eyes of the ordinary citizen, the defendants no doubt went "too far" in their opposition. But they showed they meant business, and so dissidence spread from them to 150 "intellectuals" who have already signed a manifesto — more are signing almost daily — upholding the right of Frenchmen to refuse to fight against the Moslem rebels as a matter of individual conscience.

The 150 include authors, artists and teachers, among them Jean-Paul Sartre; the movie actress Simone Signoret; Florence Malraux, the daughter of de Gaulle's Minister of Culture; Simone de Beauvoir and other internationally known figures. The government banned all the signatories from French radio and television programs (which in some cases means deprivation of livelihood), forbade quotation from their works in these media, forbade reviewing their books and suspended some of the teachers. In short, the French government made an international spectacle of itself — which, of course, was exactly what the original twenty-six wanted. But the end is not yet. The French Socialists have been increasingly restive under the de Gaulle regime, not only because of the General's inability to end the Algerian war, but over questions of wages and prices, government aid to Catholic schools and other perennial topics of contention. Now the rebellion of the Socialists will be intensified by the example of the 150, and may spread to some of the hitherto complacent French burghers. To be ineffectual is the worst sin in politics. Whatever happens to the twenty-six, whatever their failings, that reproach cannot be leveled against them.

Something to Think About

No solution of the Berlin question, or for that matter of the German question, is in sight. But West Berlin is both the crux and symbol of the conflict. Neither side can impose its will on the other. Either can precipitate a nuclear war over the city, but if one or the other resorts to this "solution" nothing will be left of Berlin and precious little of either East or West Germany.

Recognizing this impasse, Leonard Beaton, writing in the September 22 *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, has come forward with a plan which at first blush seems bizarre. He proposes *moving* West Berlin to West Germany, i.e., making geographical facts conform to political facts. The territory of West Berlin would be merged with Pankow and taken over by East Germany. East Germany would give in return a piece of Anhalt or Thuringia as a site for the new Berlin, and this territory would be merged with West Germany. The exchange would be one of land only. "Everything of value in West Berlin," Beaton writes, "would be moved into this new city, which would be the subject of an immense effort in money, engineering, and architecture by the whole Western World." Much of Berlin, like much of any great metropolis, would not be worth moving; the slums, for instance, would be razed, and the East Germans could replace them with a Stalinallé or whatever they pleased. The West Berliners would be more than compensated for their losses with modern buildings in their new city. As a part of the plan, free access would be guaranteed from either Germany to the other and, God willing, having accomplished this much, they might in time find it possible to merge into a reunified, peaceful Germany.

The more one thinks about it, the more rational it seems. Of course it is only a paper scheme; the chances are it will never be realized. But this only shows how insane the present menaces and maneuverings are. The plan has a clarifying quality, like the action of the 150 French intellectuals. It gives one some idea of the cost, in terms of property, of a nuclear war. The cost of moving Berlin would be immense — up in the billions of dollars. But ten minutes of nuclear war would do thousands of times as much property damage, and no one might be left alive to assess it. Compared with such prodigies of destruction, the transplantation of a city of 2.2 million is child's play, waste on a trifling scale, and not without its constructive aspect.

Not Guatemala Again

Newsweek (October 10) believes that with recent events "a final showdown between Cuba and the U.S. came a long step nearer." Washington was waiting for Cuba to break off diplomatic relations. Many Cubans are trying to get out while they can, and 25,000 visa applications are said to be currently on file at the U.S. Embassy. From other sources come reports of increasing discontent: *The Wall Street Journal* says the rumblings strike "a revolutionary note." There are now some 800 anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the Escambray mountains of central Cuba. Only about two-thirds are

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armed, and the leaders say they must get arms from the United States. The United States has warned its citizens to stay away from Cuba: the trickle of left-wing tourism will stop. American residents in Cuba have been warned to send their wives and children back to the United States. U.S. exports to Cuba have been cut to a trickle and a full-fledged boycott is in prospect. Senator Barry Goldwater says that the time may be "pretty close at hand" when the United States will have to use force to depose Castro. And a Cuban Roman Catholic archbishop, in a new pastoral letter, has assailed what he calls the advance of communism in that country.

What an opportunity for the Central Intelligence Agency! Castro's foes agree on only one thing: he cannot be overthrown without help from Uncle Sam, the good gray guardian of the hemisphere. ". . . . Little can be done," as *The Wall Street Journal* says, "unless the U.S., at the very least, assists quietly with arms and perhaps money — or looks the other way and lets anti-Castro groups in the U.S. ship these things to the opposition forces in Cuba." Unfortunately for the interventionists, however, the Cuban situation is far different from that which existed in Guatemala in 1954, when, with American aid and planning, a few thousand invaders were able to overthrow the Arbenz regime, which looked so red to John Foster Dulles and, in retrospect, is not even a washed-out pink. Castro has a 25,000-man army and a 200,000-man-and-woman militia. He has reserves of about $200 million in gold and dollars, mostly in European banks. And he not only has Soviet support, but popular sentiment in Latin America is behind him. He cannot be overthrown without a long period of resistance and anguished outcries against "Yankee imperialism" which will reverberate throughout South America. If he is finally overthrown, it will still be impossible to restore the Cuba of Batista, which, again in retrospect, looks so peaceful and cozy—at least to the State Department.

Undaunted by these facts of life in the Caribbean, the CIA may try its hand, but it would be wiser for the Administration to restrain it, do everything possible to avoid a complete break in relations, and let the next President start off with a situation which will be bad enough in any event, but not quite hopeless.

Everybody Pays the Gambler

Next week *The Nation* will publish a special 64-page issue — "Gambling, Inc.: Treasure Chest of the Underworld" — by Fred J. Cook.

Gambling is exciting, gambling can be a vice, gambling is almost always illegal; is gambling also a matter for concern to the public at large? You can lay odds on that.

Betting may be fun or folly to the man who makes a bet; to the man who takes it, however, betting is great big business. In his review of Alexander Heard's *The Costs of Democracy* (see p. 250), Earl Latham notes that the cash outlay for all campaigning in the Presidential year of 1952 was $140 million. He compares that figure with the estimated annual take of the slot machines in California — $200 million. That's in just one state, and a piker form of gambling at that. A few paragraphs later, Mr. Latham reports Professor Heard as estimating that in 1952 the underworld contributed 15 per cent of the political expenditures at state and local levels. The total sum was about $16 million, and was undoubtedly supplied from the gambling treasure chest.

Gambling is so commonplace in our society that it is camouflaged by its ubiquity. Recent gambling news may not seem particularly heavy, but see what a haphazard and incomplete scanning of the press for a few days can turn up:

¶ The fall college football season was scarcely a week old before two attempts at player-bribery were uncovered. One was at the University of Florida, the other an attempt to "buy" a University of Oregon player before the Michigan game at Ann Arbor. New Yorkers were involved in both attempts, one a teacher in that city's public school system.

¶ On September 28, Internal Revenue agents raided sixty-five gambling rooms in twenty-two states because the operators had not bought their $50 Federal Occupation Use stamps. Gambling is not a federal offense, and the government is in the bizarre position of taxing businesses that are illegal in the states where they operate. Anyone who buys a stamp is instantly reported to local authorities.

¶ At Belmont Park, on October 3, sixty-three winners of an unusually fat daily double refused to cash their tickets because of the federal law that the track must report by name and address all winners of bets exceeding $600. The players preferred to forfeit large sums of money to having their *perfectly legal* activities called to the attention of the government. Most of them are now busy working up false identities with a view to cashing their tickets before January 1.

¶ The *Daily Northwestern*, a college paper, reports a late-summer raid on a policy setup in Evanston, Ill. It was staged by the state attorney's office with minimal assistance from the city police. The local absence of zeal could have been connected with the facts that the head of the policy operation was a former policeman and that the city's chief of detectives resigned in the backwash of the raid.

If you don't drink, you suffer no hangover. But whether or not you ever place a bet, you pay the gamblers. See Fred J. Cook's special report next week for details on how the game is rigged against all of us.

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CONGO and EMERGENT AFRICA . . *Henry L. Bretton*

In "Straight Thinking on Africa," which appeared in The Nation *of March 5, 1960, Mr. Bretton suggested that the new African states be viewed "with the restraints provided by a sense of fairness and by sympathy." Time has proved the wisdom of this advice, which the author herewith elaborates with special reference to the Congo.*

Mr. Bretton, who has conducted field studies in Ghana and Nigeria, teaches political science at the University of Michigan. — Ed.

EVENTS IN THE Belgian Congo dramatize certain social and political problems attending the birth of new states in Africa: absence of a social structure which could in turn support a stable political system; absence of an elite which could fill positions of leadership; absence of technicians and administrators who could back up the rulers with reasonable efficiency and skill; absence of an economic structure designed to serve the demands and expectations of the indigenous population; refusal of tribalism to give way to modernity. To a greater or lesser extent these problems plague all new states in underdeveloped areas. However, it must not be overlooked that in the case of the Congo, the Belgian colonial administrators had been singularly negligent with regard to their self-proclaimed tutorial responsibilities. Not only had they failed to prepare the territory for independence, they had not even undertaken *realistic* and *significant* steps to facilitate self-government by Africans. Even more serious, they had promoted tribal disunity, created a police force not to serve Africans but to maintain European rule, and had maneuvered the colony toward financial collapse.

The crux of the political problem facing the Congo has been the conflict between Belgians intent on return to control via the economic back door and African nationalists intent on assuming power completely, totally. Under the peculiar conditions prevailing, such a clash of wills was bound to produce chaos. In a sense, the clash parallels the conflict of interests between the West and the East. The West seeks to retain some degree of control over the new African states, while the East favors total separation of the African chicks from the Western hen. In this struggle, African nationalists will tend toward the East, not necessarily because of any fundamental ideological orientation on their part, but because of an identity of policy goals, political and temporary. With the West stand those African leaders who depend for their very political existence upon the continued presence of European or United States interests in their respective countries.

This writer happens to believe that the African masses, as soon as they become aware of the implications of the struggle, will go with the nationalists.

UNDERLYING the Congo drama are several basic problems, applicable to Africa generally, which warrant closer examination:

1. *The sharply accelerating social revolution.* It is entirely unrealistic to approach the problems of reconstruction and development in Africa without facing up to the fact that removal of colonial restraints in the atomic age, under conditions of a gigantic international struggle — the cold war — must of necessity stimulate the African masses to a higher degree of social agitation than has ever been encountered anywhere else in the West. The resulting social revolution, to be controlled, must be dealt with in revolutionary terms, with revolutionary concepts and methods. The time is gone when relations between the more advanced countries of the world and the less developed ones (such as those in Latin America) could be restricted to relations between the Western governments and business interests on the one hand, and small, corrupt civilian or military cliques on the other. If the West is to retain any appreciable influence on the African continent, it must look beyond the transitory, European-trained and influenced leaders to the illiterate, poverty-stricken masses. The West must demonstrate real value to the African masses or they will force their leaders to turn elsewhere. Specifically, if the United States is to retain any influence on that continent, it must become synonymous with hope and with progress. It is now in danger of becoming a symbol of affluence unreachable by the majority of the world's peoples, of conservatism in terms of values not appreciated in underdeveloped areas, of the defense of a hated *status quo*. Western leaders would be well advised to recognize that behind every Nkrumah, Balewa, Senghor, Houphouët-Boigny, etc., are battalions of impatient Africanists, less responsible, less able, more likely to open the gates to anarchy and chaos.

In Cuba, the United States bet on leaders who did not have the support of the masses. We must not repeat that mistake. Even if a leader of caliber should have arisen in, let us say, the Congo, chances are that the exigencies of politics would have compelled him to act very much as Lumumba did. If the business of establishing relations with the new African states will at times prove frustrating, it must be remembered that the West had several centuries to prepare the people there. We may not be able to avoid dealing with Lumumbas, but we must always keep in mind that the Lumumbas are the creatures of the West. They also are the responsibility of the West. Whomever the West favors, it should support; if it does not, the newly established U. S. immigration quotas for Africa will be filled primarily by applicants for exile status in this country.

Out of Africa's social revolution arises, too, the need for coping with the prevalent poverty, disease, illiteracy. In that respect, the West, if it wishes to prevent the situation from getting out of hand, must advance from puny, piecemeal and political measures to massive developmental programs of true war-effort proportions.

2. *The artificiality of the new states and the danger of Balkanization.* The principle so long ad-

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vanced by this country, that all peoples have the right of self-determination, needs to be qualified. In Africa, the term "people" usually means occupants of a territory arbitrarily carved out of a geographic, ethnic or cultural complex, or occupants of a country which represents no more than an accident of colonial diplomacy. To insist that these people, within the limits of absurdly drawn boundaries, *must* "enjoy" the rights and privileges of self-determination is to invite the notorious troubles of the Balkans. To clothe Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Centrafricain, Somalia, even French Cameroun and Togoland in the garments of nationhood, without at the same time providing the means of subsistence, constitutes an act for which the African masses cannot be grateful. Given truly peaceful competition between East and West, joint Russo-American-European aid programs, and an enlightened attitude toward Africans on the part of the white races generally, a plethora of small African states could be manageable. Under the realities of international politics, fragmentation of Africa into feuding and competing political structures, with an extremely high instability potential, is to court disaster. Thus "self-determination" must be conceived of in terms of viability, i.e., confined to states able to give at least a minimum of economic security to their subjects. Where even this much cannot be provided out of the state's own resources, "self-determination" should be regarded neither as a right nor a privilege; it may well prove a curse.

CLOSELY linked to the problems of state formation and viability are those derived from the impact of tribalism on contemporary politics. Most of Africa's tribes are too small, too barren of social value to their members, too tradition-bound, to be worth preserving. In most cases, considering its adverse impact on the development of modern economic and political systems, tribalism might well be regarded as a form of subversion. It is within this context that African governments taking drastic measures to reduce the impact of tribalism on their development programs and on the security and stability of their states must be understood. During the colonial regime, the European powers, to a greater or lesser extent, deliberately encouraged tribalism on the principle of divide and rule.

The West must guard against false sentimentality in this respect. Insistence on legal safeguards to protect the rights of so-called minorities is suspect by African nationalist leaders, who are well aware of how the colonial powers, in the past, fostered tribal rivalries to advance their own interests. The preservation of tribes makes sense only where their survival is in the best interest of the people in a poly-tribal area, e.g., Nigeria. There, the major tribes or tribal clusters are relatively viable, while a true Nigerian nationality has not yet been established. But in most of Africa — the former Belgian Congo included — preservation of tribal structures through constitutional provisions, bills of rights, complex federal arrangements, etc. means hanging millstones around the necks of already harassed leaders.

IN ANY case, most of Africa's tribes will fail to survive the emergence of statehood, except perhaps as tourist attractions. The introduction of national symbols, institutions and practices, with economic power concentrated in the hands of centralized agencies; the increase of social mobility, the introduction of a cash economy, land reform, education, etc. — all the phenomena which flow from the establishment of national sovereignty — render the tribe socially valueless to all but the old.

Thus, with few exceptions, African governments should be encouraged rather than criticized for taking legal, political, economic and socials steps to weaken and ultimately to destroy their tribal societies. It appears — again with some notable exceptions — that certain non-African interests see a greater value in the survival of African tribalism and parochialism than is good for their reputation among the rising people of the underdeveloped world.

A realignment of state boundaries, with some but not primary attention paid to the interests of certain tribal groups, certainly appears to be desirable. But by no means should the alterations be determined by non-African commercial, mining or trading interests. Nor should non-African military interests be permitted to determine the shape of the new states. Nor, further, is there much value in the proposals that have been advanced for fixing boundaries by plebiscite; few of the people involved would understand what they were voting on. It would seem, under the circumstances, that the African political leaders should be granted the right to reach solutions by negotiation among themselves. For the United Nations to enter into the debate with armed forces, and to freeze conditions created by the departing European powers, such as was the case in the Congo, is not only a dubious practice in terms of the U.N. Charter, but will certainly lead to more unrest.

It is a safe prediction that none of the African states seated in the United Nations in September, 1960, with the possible exception of the Malagasy Republic, will survive the next five years in their present shape and form. Any attempt to preserve the pattern developed by the colonial powers for their purposes will redound to the disadvantage of Europe and the United States.

3. *The incompatibility of popular, Western democracy and the developmental requirements of the new states.* The new states of Africa, even where — as in the former British colonies — some pre-independence schooling in democratic behavior took place, have really never been exposed to Western democracy. What the people there experienced before the independence movement got under way was an authoritarian system operating under a hierarchy of alien rulers or white settlers, as in Kenya, the Rhodesias and the Congo. Subsequently, even where formal aspects of Western democracy were introduced, exceedingly small minorities of indigenous Africans participated in government and politics. Thus, at best, only a few could be counted on anywhere in Africa to provide leadership material when independence came.

Western democracy, to be opera-

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tive in a meaningful sense, requires among other things a social structure sufficiently integrated to provide common perspectives on fundamental aspects of state and society. None of the new states were so favored at the time they attained independence. Even where structural aspects were potentially favorable, the impact of the social revolution quickly rendered them ineffectual. Open democracy, under conditions prevailing in Africa today, means in most instances the organization of the country into warring camps. This is assuming that it is possible to hold elections producing reasonably accurate indexes of the public will. In most of Africa today, elections are a farce, and Western democracies, when they pretend otherwise, do not increase African appreciation of Western ways.

THE leaders in the new states, confronted by a staggering backlog of developmental tasks left to them by the departing colonial powers, thrust into the maelstrom of post-1945 cold-war politics, simply cannot afford even to go through the motions of practicing Western democracy, let alone to apply its principles in earnest.

4. *The need for the realization of the "African personality."* The African uprising of the mid-twentieth century has the support of a majority of mankind. More than that, with the strongly organized Soviet and Chinese empires willing and able to lend material assistance to the colored peoples in their struggle for self-assertion, their position vis-à-vis those with a vested interest in the *status quo* is considerably stronger than that of any other group with similar objectives in history. There is resistance, of course — most strongly from the white supremacists of the Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias, Kenya and Algeria, who in turn are cheered on by their likes in the United States, and in Europe. Next among the resisters are those who profit by maintenance of the *status quo* in Africa; to them, racial inequality means cheap labor costs and uncontested control of Africa's resources, production and transportation facilities. Of help to both these groups are those who argue that granting independence to savages — noble as some of them may be — has been a tragic error. People with this view tend to equate the consequences of centuries of Western neglect and oppression with the African personality. Rampaging soldiery in the Congo is held up as an illustration not of European failure, but of African savagery. Nobody asks how the British managed to produce the exemplary, well-disciplined troops of Ghana and Nigeria.

"At least I'm only a beginner!"

The African personality wants to be recognized as such and recognition by the West is long overdue. But the West shows signs of failing here, too. Any African assertion of independence through independent thought and action is interpreted by the West as a move towards communism. Africans will reject the notion that in order to "stay out of the Soviet camp" they must assume a Western identity. For the United States to insist on conformity in this respect, or in others, is to discard one of the last remaining opportunities of keeping Africa out of Soviet control.

IDEALLY, the orderly and peaceful transition in Africa from colonial rule to independence, from primitivity to modernity, would best be achieved in a setting of general agreement and cooperation among the great powers of the world. This being impossible under prevailing conditions, the next best approach is the selective use of the United Nations (I say "selective" because there are some aspects of the problem best handled outside the world body). But whatever the approach, the West must counter effectively the Soviet and Chinese charges that colonialism is still the underlying theme of Western policy. Events in the Belgian Congo did not dispel this suspicion, fanned as it was by Communist propaganda.

The weakest link in Western argumentation is the Western record. Any actions by the West in Africa which, while conferring formal political privileges, are yet designed to withhold economic power, will instantly arouse the gravest suspicions of the emergent African countries.

It is no reply to Soviet charges to remind Khrushchev of Soviet colonialism. In fact, such argumentation serves only to confirm Soviet allegations. Rather, the West must demonstrate a willingness to support the new African leaders against the radicals who stand behind them. This means ceding to the leaders *all* the elements of power, including access to the sources of national wealth and control over the distribution of this wealth. To make reasonably certain that these powers not be

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used to the detriment of the West, all-out efforts at creating effective cadres of technicians, administrators and leaders must be undertaken.

Setbacks will occur; if the objectives are deemed worth while, what do passing phenomena matter? Historically, the West — including the United States — has shown a willingness to work with some of the most peculiar allies to achieve its over-all goals. African leaders are entitled to be evaluated by the same standards which governed United States relations with, let us say, Stalin, Franco, Trujillo and others of that ilk for so many years. Given greater sincerity on the part of the United States and the West generally, even the Lumumbas may not turn out to be so bad.

VOICE OF THE NEUTRALS . . *by Jane Stolle*

United Nations, October 5

AT THE MOMENT, there is comparative quiet on the East River. Mr. Khrushchev has pounded his fists on the table only once in three days — and then not at the Secretary General. Indeed, at yesterday's Soviet reception, he extended a friendly hand to Mr. Hammarskjold and then gave him a warm hug. Apparently the Soviet Premier is following Mr. Macmillan's advice to "let the dust settle" after one of the stormiest fortnights in U.N.'s history.

No one expects the lull to last, inasmuch as Mr. Khrushchev has intimated that he will be around for another ten days at least. During that time many controversial items will come up again on the General Assembly agenda, and there will be more table-pounding. But it is expected that the active participation in coming debates of strong, neutralist voices will have a muffling effect on the Premier.

Never before has it been so apparent that the neutrals have a vital role to play in the Assembly and are determined to play it with all their hearts and skills. It is their conviction that — in Nehru's words — the world cannot go on "drifting toward disaster" as a result of the antagonisms among the great powers. No one nation, no two nations, no single group of nations have the right to the power of life and death over millions of innocent bystanders. This is the neutralists' philosophy, and they are determined to get the "international dialogue" going again so that the problem of disarmament, which they see as a major key to peace, will ultimately be solved.

Nor do neutral nations intend to take a back seat in any of the other controversial issues on the agenda. And this year, of course, they will be speaking with the added strength of most of the newly independent countries of Africa who, with troubles enough of their own, see no profit in sharing the troubles of the East-West blocs.

THE POTENTIAL of neutralist action has been best exemplified so far by the so-called Five Power Resolution, sponsored by India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Ghana, asking the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to "renew their contacts interrupted recently" (how genteel is the voice of diplomacy!). Mr. Nehru pointed out that nowhere in the resolution was the word "Summit" or "conference" mentioned, nor — in view of the American election coming up — was the President of the United States identified by name. The document, emphasized the Indian Prime Minister, was neither for nor against one side or the other; it simply advocated another attempt at getting the two sides together at a time when their relations are dangerously strained.

Mr. Nehru stressed that the call for a meeting between the two heads of state, coming as it would from the United Nations, implied a truth that was too often overlooked: the whole world, and not the great powers alone, had a stake in a U.S.-USSR *détente*. That is why he expressed himself as bitterly opposed to an amendment, offered by Australia, calling for an early Summit meeting of the Big Four. This, he said, was a "cold-war" approach, an attempt to settle problems affecting the world by a closed quartet. "Where do we, who happen to be in the outer darkness, come in?" he asked.

The Assembly roundly defeated the Australian amendment, which gained only five votes. But then, in the debate on the original resolution, the West managed to force so many truncations of text as to reduce the document to an absurdity; and the sponsors, rather than press for something they now considered meaningless, withdrew their resolution entirely. But even though beaten in their first show of united force, the neutralists revealed impressive strength in both leadership and in numbers; they showed both East and West that they had the majority of small nations solidly behind them.

THE NEUTRALISTS will have further chances for leadership in the course of this Assembly. During the general debate, they have already made concrete suggestions for U.N. action in several areas no less delicate than that of an East-West *détente*. These suggestions will undoubtedly strongly influence debate where it counts the most — in the committees that finally shape the end results of General Assembly sessions.

Take, for instance, the Congo question — the thorny problem that has all but split the U.N. wide open, and shows every sign of continuing to be troublesome for a long time to come. Three governments now claim

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authority in the Congo, and U.N.'s troops there, and the technical assistance people in Leopoldville, must soon know with which they must deal. The alternative is chaos and inevitable removal of the U.N. presence. Yet removal would mean the failure of one of the most important U.N. missions to date — and would, in all probability, also mean the resignation of the Secretary General. For though Mr. Hammarskjold has refused to resign under Soviet pressure, it is felt that his tenure in office is largely dependent upon developments in the Congo.

The Secretary General intimated as much in the brief but significant address he made to the Assembly on October 3 in which he refused Mr. Khrushchev's invitation to step down. It was up to the newly independent, uncommitted powers, not the Russians, to pass on his handling of the Congolese situation, he said in effect. "Let the countries who have liberated themselves in the past fifteen years speak for themselves," Mr. Hammarskjold stated bluntly, and Mr. Khrushchev began pounding on the table.

The new African states will have opportunity to speak for themselves when the Congo question comes up in committee. Many of them are attending their first U.N. session. Bewildered by much that goes on, they are nevertheless certain of two things: that the U.N. is their friend, and that the East-West struggle is their enemy.

Even so, they are critical of some of the aspects of the U.N. operation in the Congo. And so is Mr. Khrushchev — violently. Now Mr. Hammarskjold tells them that he depends upon them to back his Congo policy. How can the African states criticize that policy, where they feel it needs criticizing, without seeming to fall into the Eastern camp? And if, through lack of their support, Mr. Hammarskjold eventually finds it necessary to resign, will the U.N. then go through structural changes which will weaken it?

This is the dilemma faced by the African states. Mr. Nehru, the neutralist, suggests a way out: "The General Assembly might well consider sending a delegation to the Congo to find out what foreign troops or other personnel, apart from those sent on behalf of the United Nations, are still there, and how far they are interfering in local affairs." That would take care of the Africans' fear that the U.N. has not been sufficiently diligent in clearing out the hated colonial power, Belgium. Further, said Mr. Nehru:

> There is at present an elected Parliament in the Congo, although it does not appear to be functioning. I think that it should be the function of the United Nations to help this Parliament to meet and function so that, out of its deliberations, the problems of the Congo may be dealt with by the people themselves. . . . The functioning of Parliament may itself lead to the ironing out of internal differences.

WHETHER MR. NEHRU'S suggestions are entirely workable is not as important as that they envisage a positive, new approach to the Congo problem which yet leaves the matter in the hands of the U.N. Mr. Nehru, unlike Mr. Khrushchev, does not propose to throw out the baby with the bath. Even though he implies a degree of censure of actions already taken, he does not ask for the Secretary General's head in retribution. In fact, the Indian Prime Minister took pains to make clear his opposition to the Russian proposal of replacing Mr. Hammarskjold with a three-member executive composed of one representative each of the Eastern, Western and neutral blocs. What Mr. Nehru did suggest was that the Secretary General himself consider what organizational steps might be taken to "modernize" the world body.

Though the distinguished Indian leader was the foremost spokesman of the neutrals in this first, tense period of the current Assembly session, President Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nasser of the United Arab Republic played important behind-the-scenes roles, and are expected to continue to wield influence from their respective capitals. And then, of course, there was the greatest undeclared neutralist of them all, the remarkable Mr. Macmillan. The British Prime Minister denied sternly that he was a "broker" between East and West; but, then, why did he spend so much time with President Eisenhower in private conclave, and with Mr. Khrushchev in equally private converse, if he were not intent on doing a bit of "honest brokering"?

The Candidates and Foreign Policy . . *by J. David Singer*

MANY THINGS occurring in the political life of America cast doubt on our ability to cope with the demands of our international environment, but none shakes the confidence of this observer as much as the quadrennial popularity contest known as the Presidential campaign. Elections in general, and Presidential ones in particular, seem to bring forth exactly those national attributes which are least likely to be effective in the formulation and execution of foreign policy: the exaggeration of differences, the attribution of all virtue to one protagonist and all vice to the other, the sacrifice of long-range considerations to the passions of the present, vigorous appeals to the aggressive, the competitive and the parochial in us (and, what is worse, a remarkable response to these appeals).

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This is the recurrent moment of the half-truth, the slogan, the inference and the evasion; one wonders not only whether we *can* survive and prosper as a nation, but whether we even *should*. And if this combination clambake, side show and soap opera distresses the domestic observer, it absolutely appalls the friendly foreigner. The current campaign prompts me to ask two relevant and important questions: First, what are—or should be—the major purposes of a Presidential campaign in a democratic nation? Second, to what extent is this particular campaign fulfilling these purposes?

One answer to the first is found in the widely (and often passionately) held view that the purpose is to win. This very direct position may understandably be held by those deeply involved in the fight for office; victory is the *raison d'etre*. A more objective position might be that the campaign serves to decide who is to fill the office or group of offices—that in such a fashion a democratic society selects those by whom it shall be governed. But whether the winning of elections or the selection of office-holders is the interpretation used—and the difference may be semantic—we still have a markedly incomplete picture of the function of our political campaign.

TO THIS observer, at least, the selection of a candidate must be relegated to an inferior role in the competitive political process. One question that must continue to arise in the mind of a thoughtful and farsighted observer, as campaigns come and go, is precisely how much difference it makes whether Mr. Black or Mr. White, Party Blue or Party Red, emerges victorious. This may sound like heresy to the passionate devotees of one or the other candidate or party, but a moment of reflection should suggest that it may well be a relevant concern. From the detached and longer-range point of view, it becomes apparent that political, economic and social events develop in response to such a vast complexity of psychic and material forces that the single individual, or the single political party, is only partially capable of either changing



their impact or responding to them in any but a rather uniform and more or less predetermined fashion.

This is not to suggest that the political future is completely predictable, or that it makes *no* difference to us or any other nation who wins a particular election. The point is that we have too often sharply exaggerated the difference that it *does* make, have assumed that all is lost if X wins, whereas a victory for Y will open the doors to political Utopia. Clearly the truth is in between, and when a major network advertises its campaign coverage by alleging that "during the next forty-four days the American people will make the crucial decision that will *determine the nation's course* over the next four years," it engages in an extraordinary exaggeration of one man's capacity to shape events. This belief in crisis may help in getting people to exercise their franchise, but it also is a message that has been so often repeated and so seldom borne out that one cannot blame the citizenry for some of its cynicism.

A second answer to the question of a campaign's purpose emphasizes the educational function of a national election, and focuses on the potentialities which a campaign offers in terms of raising and discussing significant national and international issues confronting the society. Two important considerations lie behind such an emphasis. In more immediate terms, a campaign which produces an intelligent and honest discussion of (a) what the relevant issues *are*, and (b) how they might best be dealt with, is more likely to elect the more competent candidate and party. One cannot repeat too frequently the obvious fact that popularity contests are not designed to bring to office those most capable of fulfilling the job. Our national history is filled with illustrations of this fact, some in the very recent past.

But there may be an even more compelling, if more indirect, case to be made for the campaign which defines and seeks to clarify the crucial issues of the time. We are all familiar with the argument that the electorate is lazy, uninterested and unresponsive in the periods between elections. That being so—and it is hardly open to question—those involved in the campaigns contend that the only way to arouse the electorate is to rely upon short-run appeals. Because the citizen is cynical, appeal to his selfish interests, not to his idealism. Because he is lazy, appeal to his passions, not to his intellect. Because he is indifferent, appeal to his sense of the dramatic, not to his sense of the rational. Because he is parochial, appeal to his chauvinism, not to his patriotism. And so on.

In other words, the major justification for the sort of campaign we usually get is the ignorance and indifference of the voter, and this justification comes not only from partisans and those most immediately involved in the pursuit of office, but from others who might be expected to take a more sophisticated, objective and future-oriented view. Thus, many of my colleagues of the political science profession can be found, in their scholarly as well as their more public utterances, defending the general thesis that one must be "realistic" in the appraisal as well as the practice of domestic politics. After all, one is always reminded, politics is the "art of the possible."

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It is remarkable that so few of us have commented on an obvious aspect of this political "realism"—its lethal circularity. Why is the citizen cynical? Is it because of some fatal trait in our national character? Why is he mentally lazy? Because of the inadequacies of our schooling? Is his indifference solely a function of other and less worthy preoccupations? Is his apathy attributable only to his lack of political influence? It would seem that these are but partial explanations for the shortcomings we constantly assign to the American citizen—or to any other democratic citizenry, for that matter. But clearly there are other variables, and I would contend that one of the most significant is to be found in the election campaign itself. Is it not logical to expect that demagoguery will contribute to cynicism, that diatribe will contribute to indifference? Does it not follow that chauvinism and short-sightedness on the part of the office-seeker will encourage similar tendencies in the populace? In a sense, much of what passes for political campaigning provides psychological rewards to those in the electorate (liberal or conservative) who are most lazy, bigoted and indifferent, while it imposes annoyance, chagrin and intellectual indignities upon those who might be otherwise disposed. I suggest that the candidates, their advisers and their apologists must accept a major portion of the responsibility for the vicious circle which we have generated in American politics, and must be recognized as playing a crucial role in the gradual erosion of one of the most important strands in our social fabric.

ANOTHER argument that we often hear from the "realists" is that one cannot accomplish anything until elected. What is the use of a good man's going down to defeat solely because he refused to meet the unscrupulous adversary on the latter's terms? First of all, this strikes me as a stand of unparalleled arrogance: I am so much nobler and better qualified for the office than my opponent that I am duty bound to save the office from his corruption and incompetence even if I must cut ethical corners in the process. What justifies one man, or his party, to claim such mental and moral superiority that they may resort to any means in order to assure victory? And this gross arrogance is often misplaced: either it turns out that no amount of demagoguery or connivance is sufficient to win against the evil forces of the opposition, or he who does win in such a campaign turns out to be less competent or vigorous in office than he and his supporters had predicted. Habit also has considerable impact on the human animal; can we assume that the truth-bender, the opportunist and the corner-cutter will automatically revert to clean-cut, wholesome idealism once he is safely ensconced in office? If these techniques worked so well in achieving office, perhaps they will work just as well in retaining and exploiting office.

Before turning to a discussion of this current campaign, one other aspect of the "realist's" position on the purposes of campaigns needs to be mentioned, and that is the counsel that, while all of the above criticism may well be true, there is really nothing to be done about it. Our election system may be attracting the more mediocre, electing the less responsible, and destroying the public's interest and faith in the democratic process, but that is the nature of political reality. It does seem odd, though, that often those who justify all manner of evasion, half-truth and demagoguery on the ground that their candidate's victory will produce far-reaching and benign changes in our domestic or international situation are the same ones who contend that nothing can be done to change the atmosphere under which elections take place. Such inconsistency is not only depressing, but certain to help insure that such changes will, in fact, *not* take place. Despite the persistence of most social and political forces, it would seem that there is nothing immutable about our domestic political environment. With a respectable amount of courage and honesty on the part of even a handful of political figures, much might be done to reverse the downward spiral of American politics.

Let us now take a hard look at the current Presidential campaign and compare it to the model discussed above. What will it do besides decide who will be the next occupant of the White House? How does it stack up so far in terms of articulating the crucial issues and possible approaches to them? Is it any improvement over previous Presidential elections in educating the public and permitting an intelligent evaluation of the candidates? Because of the relative absence of invective, many commentators feel that the campaign so far has been conducted satisfactorily, and on a level suitable to our national dignity.

But I am not at all sure that this sort of gentility is a healthy sign; one is almost tempted to describe it as a conspiracy between the two candidates to avoid those specifics which might embarrass one or the other without promising any compensating popularity.

Each candidate seems to be adhering to the orthodox strategy which holds that the more general you are in articulating a position, the less vulnerable you are to attack or criticism. Generalities and platitudes always offer plenty of room for maneuver when talking about the future. On the other hand, the candidates become somewhat more specific in discussing the past, and each has not only laid the sins of the past at the other party's doorstep but has occasionally named names and pinpointed events.

WE HAVE been watching this depressing pattern emerge from the moment that Frank Church and Walter Judd began to deliver their convention perorations. The former previewed Kennedy's strategy when he identified Republican complacency and economy-mindedness ("Is it possible . . . that this, the richest nation in history, can no longer afford to be the strongest?") as the major cause of our loss of prestige and power vis-à-vis the USSR. The Democrats are specific enough in blaming the past on their opponents, but as for the future, all they say is that America must get "on the move." How we will get on the move is not made clear; and where the

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money will come from, and into what specific programs it will go, are not spelled out. We will be stronger and more powerful, but the planned dimensions are unstated. We will assume the "initiative" with the Soviets; but whether in terms of military threat, diplomatic retaliation, or something more mature, nobody says.

On the Republican side, Judd's keynote was so misleading that even *The New York Times* had to call it "divisive." Again, the multitude was advised that the Soviet Premier "would prefer not to negotiate with a Republican President who . . . will not be taken in or intimidated or tricked into any concessions," and that the Democrats gave the Russians a "free hand in the Balkans," "agreed to the Communist take-over of a hundred million people in Eastern Europe," and "turned back when victory was in sight" in Korea.

WHAT THE foreign-policy debate boils down to, then, is who can best stand up to Khrushchev. While I believe that the USSR does represent the most immediate and serious threat to our security, and that a profoundly important dimension of that threat is military capability, this is only *one* of the many foreign-policy problems facing us now and in the next decade or so. First of all, it should be perfectly obvious that no all-out program in weapons development and production is likely to enhance our security. The Soviets can readily match us, qualitatively and quantitatively, in any arms race. Is so pointless and dangerous a competition, combined with diplomatic belligerence, the best that we can offer in the way of policy? Is that elusive posture of strength the American Holy Grail? I don't believe that it is, and I doubt whether Nixon or Kennedy believes it is either. But if we go on what the candidates are saying, that impression clearly emerges. Again, they seem to have succumbed to the temptation to say things which they think make their listeners feel good. There's something very satisfying in waving the flag, standing up to the adversary, and generally talking tough. But do these things enhance American security—or increase the probability of world peace?

What both candidates *should* be doing is addressing themselves in concrete detail to two particular problems arising out of the power struggle with the Soviet Union. One of these is how to move into a military relationship with the Soviets which is considerably more stable than today's delicate balance of terror. The second is how to exploit that stability, once achieved, by moving beyond it in such a way that we and they can safely get out of the armament competition business.

In their future TV debates, Nixon and Kennedy might well perform a vital service to the nation and to the world if they were to debate and discuss such questions as the following:

¶Can we afford to develop a strategy solely on the basis of what we believe to be *the* Kremlin strategy, or might it not be better—given the difficulty of such predictions — to search for an operational code which could deal with *several* possible alternative strategies? After all, it is no more certain that the USSR will *never* resort to force than that they have never *abandoned* plans to resort to force. If we are, therefore, not sure of their plans—and it is most likely that *they're* not sure, either—what kinds of weapons systems and quantities and disposition are most likely to dissuade them from force?

¶Does the airborne alert, or civil defense, or soft and vulnerable missile sites, or espionage flights, or German nuclear armament, serve to deter or to provoke the Russians? Admittedly, we cannot paralyze ourselves simply because anything we do the Kremlin might interpret as provocative. But couldn't we attempt to balance the risks? Couldn't our candidates, in public debate, try to assay the provocation effect of certain weapons and strategies against the need for both the deterrent effect and a win-the-war capability if deterrence fails?

¶What cooperative arrangements could we and the Soviets work out, either explicitly or implicitly, to enhance the military stability of the coming years? For example, where do Nixon and Kennedy stand on President Eisenhower's very promising proposal that we try to negotiate a monitoring arrangement for all missile, rocket and satellite launchings? And do they agree with his call for a renunciation of lunar and other celestial claims?

Without debate on issues such as these, the electorate has little rational basis for choosing between the national-security policies of the two parties. Moreover, neither the Presidential candidates nor their Congressional colleagues have any idea of where the public might stand on these issues if they were ever raised.

A debate along these lines might be valuable abroad as well as to the U.S. electorate. Difficult as it may be for Americans to understand, many of the world's leaders and their publics — including those of the USSR — are not at all sure that we arm only for defensive and deterrent purposes. It is not inconceivable that, as far as armaments go, at least, the Kremlin's behavior is purely defensive and deterrent, too. Why not do what we can to reassure the adversary, as well as the neutrals, that we seek competition only in the non-military realms.

THE SAME arguments apply to the second major problem arising out of our military relations with the Soviets: Once we have established some sort of trend toward stability, how can we move through that phase as rapidly and safely as possible into the beginnings of a serious reciprocal arms-reduction arrangement? On this problem, too, we have heard precious little from the office-seekers. Each has paid lip service to "disarmament," but neither seems to have questioned seriously — privately or publicly — the accepted view that Soviet intransigence on inspection is solely to blame for the failures to date. This may be a large part of it, but is it not possible that the inspection demands which we have made go beyond what the Kremlin can safely accept at the moment? Not that there can really be too *much* inspection, but perhaps our own security requirements call for something less than we have been demanding. And

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since we seem willing to settle for a weapons combination that may perhaps have a 50 per cent probability of deterring Soviet attack, is it reasonable to press for an inspection agreement with a 100 per cent probability of deterring evasion?

In connection with disarmament, have the candidates thought about the relative priority of conventional versus nuclear weapons, warheads versus delivery systems, production versus existing stockpiles, etc.? Which of these would they concentrate on first and which would they insist must be negotiated simultaneously? And on the most immediate of the arms-control issues, do they believe that the continued development and improvement of tactical nuclear weapons are more important than getting a test ban and preventing the further spread of these mass-destruction weapons? Furthermore, where would Nixon and Kennedy stand on some of the fundamental side issues related to arms reduction, such as the creation of a U.N. force?

As with defense, there is a large area of the disarmament issue which Nixon and Kennedy could debate usefully without revealing important secrets, weakening our bargaining position or otherwise jeopardizing our security. On the contrary, an honest debate on these issues would help clarify some crucial problems for ourselves, and present a far more favorable image to the rest of the world. In this vein, let me emphasize that it would be extremely dangerous to inject defense or disarmament issues into the campaign in a hasty, ill-considered fashion. In 1956, Adlai Stevenson raised the test-ban question during the closing days of the campaign in what appeared to be a desperate effort to find a new issue and stave off defeat. Not only did this exercise fail to win the Democrats the election, but (along with Eisenhower's response) it so muddied the arms-control waters that any serious consideration of the issue after Election Day became almost impossible. Another caveat is in order here. Just as it seems irresponsible to engage in a "who-can-be-tougher-on-Khrushchev" contest, it would be equally irresponsible to make demagogic appeals to the voters' desire for peace. (Who can forget the Eisenhower promise to "go to Korea" in order to terminate "Truman's war" during the 1952 election campaign?) Whether we have peace or war will depend a great deal on what the USSR and other states do; nevertheless, the matter is not completely beyond our own control. We cannot by ourselves *determine* the course of events, but certainly we can influence them.

THE NATURE of a Presidential campaign is not solely up to the national parties and their top candidates and advisers. The general public—or at least that part of it which is, despite our political legacy, reasonably astute, critical and open-minded—must refuse to be fobbed off by clichés, platitudes, slogans and evasions. If we will continue to press the office-seekers for more detail and less equivocation, those who want to conduct honest campaigns will have a greater incentive to do so and will be less disadvantaged than they now are by the combination of slick opponents and gullible or ill-informed voters.

An equally important role also exists for the men and women of the public media. Despite a responsible minority, the bulk of our reporters and commentators have done much to degrade all of our political life, including election campaigns. With a preference for the dramatic and the over-simplified, they have not only pandered to the sloganeering and evasive office-seekers, but have often coined the very slogans which the politician uses to confuse, mislead, obfuscate and prevaricate. Then there is the reporter or interviewer who thinks that the way to avoid this pitfall is to play the role of cross-examiner and public prosecutor; the style, which has been in vogue since the inception of television particularly, turns out to be more ill-mannered than probing. Why cannot more newspaper and TV interviewers do their homework more carefully, ask questions that are intelligent and germane, and refuse to be put off by the evasion or half-truth? If the media people had a good grasp of the facts and insisted on fuller responses, the evasive or ill-informed office-seeker might have to do some reforming himself.

With these last comments in mind, let me suggest that the current campaign offers an unprecedented opportunity for a sharp break with those of the past. It has not yet fully degenerated into mud-slinging and vilification; both candidates are exceptionally intelligent and articulate, each has a relatively competent group of substantive (as well as tactical) advisers, and the real problems of the moment are intrinsically of great import and interest to the electorate. Moreover, the television networks have provided an opportunity for the candidates to confront each other face to face. The first of these confrontations was novel, interesting and partially useful in terms of the functions outlined earlier. But it had too much of the formal quality of a high-school debate, and each was preoccupied with making "points." Moreover, the rigid time schedule did not allow any of the issues to get as thorough an airing as needed—perhaps to our contenders' relief. What is needed is the opportunity to pursue these questions to greater depth, beyond the recitation of facts and counter-facts, allegations and counter-allegations. I should like to see more "thinking on one's feet" and less regurgitation of pre-digested (and pre-tested) stock utterances.

As the face-to-face confrontations continue, I would like to propose that the sorts of issues suggested here be included in the agenda. They have the virtue not only of being critical to our future and exciting to the electorate, but are such as could easily lose votes—or win them—for either side in the debate. On the other hand, with candidates as intelligent and articulate as Nixon and Kennedy, it need not present imposing risks.

There is much to be said for the traditional, safe, orthodox type of campaign strategy, but there is more to be said for a rather radical departure. Isn't it just possible that there is more at stake on November 8 than the simple question of who will ride down Pennsylvania Avenue on January 20?

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BOOKS and the ARTS

Money in Politics

THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY. By Alexander Heard. University of North Carolina Press. 493 pp. $6.

MONEY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC REPORTING. By Herbert E. Alexander. Citizens' Research Foundation. 87 pp. $.50.

Earl Latham

WILL ROGERS, the prairie sage of a generation ago, made a remark which Alexander Heard uses in his excellent book, *The Costs of Democracy*. "Politics," said Rogers in 1931, "has got so expensive that it takes lots of money to even get beat with." A recent advertisement in New York solicited funds for Kennedy and Johnson with the notice that a contribution of $5 would buy four seconds of television time in a city of more than 145,000 people, or fourteen seconds of local radio in a key area, or one-tenth of a large billboard, or one column inch of newspaper space in a city with more than 600,000 residents. A contributor who sneezed while watching his candidate on television could easily miss the $5 worth of words his contribution bought.

Some perspective, however, is needed on the whole subject, and Professor Heard's book supplies it. *The Costs of Democracy* is the most extensive work on the subject in three decades; it analyzes in careful detail the results of a broad cooperative project begun in 1953. One of its best qualities is the sense of political context in which the discussion of campaign financing is set, and the attention given to companion and comparable evidence. Thus the author estimates that the total cash outlay for all campaigning in the United States in 1952 was $140 million. Frankly, this disappointed me, as Churchill is said to have been disappointed when told that all the brandy he could consume in a lifetime probably would not exceed a tank car in volume. Considering the high costs of campaigning ($5 for four seconds of television time), it would seem that we ought to have spent more. And the amount certainly dwindles in significance when compared with other expenditures that Professor Heard reports. Slot machines in California have an estimated annual take of $200 million, and in 1952 one advertising company alone handled billings exceeding the $140 million for all campaigns. The 1955 campaign in Israel is thought to have cost $5 per capita, while the 1952 campaign in America cost about 90 cents.

THERE are many myths about money in politics that the evidence does not fully support. One of these is that the man who spends the most is the man who wins. If this were so, the Republicans would be in office much more than they are. In the 1958 election, the Massachusetts Republican State Committee reported expenditures seven times greater than those of the Democratic State Committee and wound up losing the entire state administration and control of both houses of the legislature for the first time in the history of the Commonwealth. Professor Heard believes that the effect of money in politics "is probably more certain in determining who the candidates will be than in determining the outcome of elections." This restriction is not necessarily invidious, however. A man whose prospects of victory are poor may find it hard to get financial support, while many may want to back a likely winner. In fact some careful spenders are known to withhold their contributions until after the race is decided.

Another dubious popular fancy is that campaigns are financed by a few fat cats who thereby buy influence. There are fat cats, of course, and they do buy influence — although the pay-off may turn out to be appointment to an embassy where the expenses far exceed the salary and allowances that go with the job. In some figures on known contributions in 1952 by ninety-two directors of the hundred largest corporations, Professor Heard reports a net total of $1,014,900 given to the two major parties; and for similar figures for 199 officers and directors of 225 corporations in 1956, the total was $1,936,847. In each instance the amounts given to the Republicans were approximately ten times those given to the Democrats—evidence supporting the general opinion that fat cats liked the Republicans better than the Democrats in 1952 and 1956, and doubtless in 1960. But it took 8 million people to contribute the millions of dollars that were reported as campaign expenditures in 1952 and 1956.

As there is a marked difference in the availability of funds to Democrats and Republicans, so is there a marked difference in the techniques used by both

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The Incomparable Light

The light beyond compare is the light I saw.
I saw it on the mountain tops, the light
Beyond compare. I saw it in childhood too.
I glimpsed it in the turbulence of growing.
I saw it in the meshes of meaning of women.
I saw it in political action, and I beheld
The light beyond compare in sundry deaths.

Elusive element, final mystery,
The light beyond compare has been my visitant,
Some sort of angel sometimes at my shoulder,
A beckoning guide, elusive nevertheless,
Under the mind where currents of being are running,
It is this strange light I come back to,
Agent of truth, protean, a radical of time.

The light beyond compare is my meaning,
It is the secret source of my beginning,
Issuance of uniqueness, signal upon suffering,
It is the wordless bond of all endings,
It is the subtle flash that tells our song,
Inescapable brotherhood of the living,
Our mystery of time, the only hopeful light.

RICHARD EBERHART

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for getting them. As befits a party with a sensitive interest in money, the Republicans have a superior procedure for gathering it in, one that dates from 1937 and the pioneer work of a dedicated Republican businessman from Pittsburgh by the name of Carlton G. Ketchum. After the Republican disaster of 1936, the main lines of financial procedure were laid down. The central financial organ of the party is the national finance committee which enforces five basic rules: all Republican solicitations are made in a unified campaign like a United Fund Drive; fund-raising activities are centralized in a state finance committee with which county committees enter contractual agreements for quotas and refunds; fund-raising is organized separately from "political activities" (the money men think that politicians are inefficient); fund-raising is a year-round activity; and technical skills are borrowed from professional fund-raisers. There are departures from this fiscal model but, until recently at least, about two-thirds of the states and territories used it.

The Democrats, on the other hand, are always up in a balloon without astrolabe or ballast. The Democratic practice resembles that prevailing among the Republicans in states they regard as "unorganized." Except in the small-sum campaigns, the Democrats have not combined soliciting for the national committees with soliciting for state and local needs. They have not "exhibited the concern for planned diligent fund-raising that their financial disadvantage in most quarters would seem to impel." Another great contrast between the fiscal practices of the two parties is the difference in social prestige and position between the money men for the Republicans and those for the Democrats. The Republicans care enough to send the very best, and Republican finance committee chairmen give it tone. In 1952, for example, Sinclair Weeks headed the Republican finance committee and became Secretary of Commerce.

The Democratic Party cannot count upon general support from the business community but it has constituencies of its own. Among these are the labor unions. They are forbidden by law to make contributions to political parties or candidates out of union treasuries, but they can provide funds through separate organizations. As 1936 was a hinge year in Republican political financial practice, so it was a turning point for political financing by organized labor. In that year, reported political expenditures by interstate labor organizations ran to more than $750,000, or eight times more than the A.F. of L. had spent in the previous thirty years for the same purpose. The reported expenditures have been even more substantial in recent years, falling somewhere between $1,500,000 and $1,750,000 in each of the elections of 1952, 1954, 1956 and 1958. In addition to this reported money, unreported but probably "politically relevant" sums were obtained from the national unions. They were not reported because the law on the subject is confused, i.e., expenditures for education need not be reported. The perennial debate over labor money in politics is less an abstract concern over right and wrong than a practical campaign struggle for control of the government and the public policies it enforces.

THERE is an area, however, where political financing does raise questions of morality, namely, in the busy activity of the underworld. Indeed there is a theory about politics that places the underworld at the very base of the American political system. Professor Heard does not accept this view, but agrees that from time to time there are revelations so startling that they are often too quickly dismissed as being not typical. Syndicated crime which supplies illegal goods and services on a vast scale cannot run without protection and the need for protection invites a friendly interest in politics. The connections between the underworld and politics are to be found in the wards and the precincts where politicians and mobsters have a mutual interest in campaign funds. Professor Heard estimates that 15 per cent of the political expenditures at state and local levels in 1952 was contributed by underworld sources, or a probable total of about $16 million.

Professor Heard thinks that three principles should guide the development of an adequate system of campaign finance in a democracy. First, there must be enough money to allow at least the main contestants to present themselves and their ideas to the electorate. Second, this money should be collected in such a way that it does not "inordinately weight the processes of government in favor of special political interests." And third, the system should command the confidence of the citizenry. Many reforms have been proposed to achieve these principles, one of the most persistent being outright government subsidy of political campaigns, which was suggested by Theodore Roosevelt in 1907, and since supported by many others, including Harry Truman. No country has assumed complete campaign costs, but several provide subsidies of one kind or another. In the United States, many of the costs of campaigning formerly borne by the parties are now the responsibility of the government; for example, the printing of ballots and the conduct of primaries. Senator Neuberger's effort in 1956 to provide direct payments to the national committees of each party from public funds failed to muster much support, but the precedent for governmental subsidies is well established, and the further assumption of campaign costs by government is probable.

A variation of the suggestion for outright subsidies to candidates is the proposal that government at least help them to communicate with the electorate —for example, by providing free postage, bearing the cost of campaign pamphlets, and underwriting advertisements of a certain number and kind. Income tax concessions have often been urged in the last ten years—a proposal that would raise political contributions to the level of the tax-deductible entertainment that businessmen may provide customers. Minnesota in 1955 and California in 1957 permitted such deductions and the principle of a federal tax concession gained at least formal political support when the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration in 1957 favorably reported a bill to allow limited deductions.

IF PUBLIC confidence in campaign finance were higher, the impulse to give might be stimulated more successfully. Although citizens of the United States have greater information on political finance than those of any other nation, the reporting system is nevertheless defective. There is no reliable way to find out the amounts actually received and spent: the information available for the campaigns for which federal reports have to be made is incomplete, and not all the campaigns are covered. Herbert Alexander has recently studied the problem for the Citizens' Research Foundation, and his first-rate pamphlet, *Money, Politics, and Public Reporting,* provides in detail the case for better political financial reports. It is difficult enough to find out what candidates for the Congress get and spend in their campaigns; it is almost impossible to do so for candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency. According to Mr. Alexander, the definition of a "candidate" in the federal statutes excludes those who run for these offices, and there is, therefore, no way of knowing for certain how much is spent for the

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most important election in the entire political system.

There are other gaps in the system. State and local committees with intrastate jurisdiction and the state and local committees of the national parties are not required to report to the Congress; nor is anyone required to file federal reports on the vast pre-election activity which is sometimes decisive in the final result—the caucuses, conventions and primaries.

Although the state of campaign financing is unsatisfactory, it once was worse. Matthew Josephson in *The Politicos* mentions the Belshazzar's Feast at Delmonico's in 1884 when Blaine "was given an ovation by two hundred of New York's Money Kings" and made a speech after which the "orator and his hosts retired to the back rooms of the restaurant, with the doors closed to the press, and took up a collection of emergency funds." The secrecy of this operation is in contrast with the $100-plate dinners, with a closed-circuit television speech to a score of cities, that characterizes the efforts of candidates today to collect the necessary. And they may do it more successfully, for Josephson reports that the Delmonico dinner was a financial failure, since the massed millionaires were much less generous than had been expected.

The Prodigal Rebel

THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF THOMAS ERNEST HULME. By Alun R. Jones. Beacon Press. 233 pp. $4.50.

Leo Hamalian

APART from the academic *cognoscenti* and a handful of common readers who may have stumbled across a volume called *Speculations,* few Americans know the name of T. E. Hulme. Yet before he was blown up by a German shell in 1917 at the age of thirty-four, he had profoundly influenced such contemporaries as Yeats, Pound, Eliot (who imitated his habit of using initials), Wyndham Lewis and Jacob Epstein. Though he published little during his lifetime, more than any other writer he is responsible for "modernism" in the temper and thought of our literary age; had he survived, he might have been its Samuel Johnson or Coleridge. In fact, his name by 1939 had become in England part of a myth: a fabrication of revolutionary poet, religious reactionary, Fascist philosopher, amateur militarist, gentleman lecher.

It is this myth that Alun Jones, a lecturer at Hull University, sets out to explore, and by the end of 143 pages of crisp prose, quiet wit and beautifully compressed research (which make one forget the occasional repetition and Namesmanship), he not only emerges with a fascinating and probably definitive biography, but also succeeds in separating the man from the myth. In doing so, he reverses the usual direction of such "debunking": in the naked light of fact, the man looms larger than the myth.

HULME started his career as a powerful and highly intelligent son reacting against family and background (middle class, conservative, authoritarian) and ended it more firmly a part of the very world against which he reacted. At Cambridge, he would cat-call in the theatre, hold rowdy parties in his rooms and break shop windows. He was sent down for hitting a policeman and left town astride a coffin in a memorable mock funeral. Indifferent to the respectable careers open to him (the family pottery business, science, or civil service), he resided in London before exiling himself to Canada. There, "haunted by the vast images of space," he suffered "the fright of the mind before the unknown and accepted the insignificance of man and the strength of God." This faith and his consequent belief in Original Sin, he insisted, was rooted not in bigotry but in this experience. Later, he asserted that man was born with an instinct for religion and that if the instinct were thwarted, it would find a less vital outlet.

For Hulme, that outlet at first was poetry. After returning to London in 1908, he organized the Poets' Club in a Soho restaurant and founded the movement later called imagism. Through the image he revolutionized a craft that had become soggy and discursive. What he did was not, naturally, to invent the poetic image, but to raise it to the level of principle and thus to emphasize the power of sharp, concrete visual analogies devoid of abstract emotive language. If he did not die to make verse free, he did invent one that was spare and economical to the point of being cryptic ("Above the quiet dock in midnight, / Tangled in the tall mast's corded height, / Hangs the moon. What seemed so far away / Is but a child's balloon, forgotten after play").

When Hulme tired of his own tenets, Ezra Pound took them over, publicizing and practicing them with enough gusto and genius to make himself known as the leader of the movement. As always, he freely acknowledged his indebtedness by printing five poems by Hulme in *Ripostes.* But Hulme's theory gains its most coherent expression, not in the imagists, but in the early poetry of Eliot. Of Eliot's many tokens of gratitude the most moving comes in the great *Four Quartets*: the "dead master" buried on a "distant shore," who materializes after the air raid, is not Pound or Mallarmé, as critics have suggested, but Hulme himself. If Mr. Jones does not point this out, it may be because he prefers fact to speculation of this sort.

NEXT, Hulme turned to philosophy. His picture of the world was "fragmentary, unsystematic, and in the final analysis, incoherent" (he tried to integrate into one complete system a number of incompatible elements), but it proved attractive since it preached revolution based upon reaction at a time when intellectuals ambivalently hungered for both. The advance of civilized man, according to Hulme, was due to traditions and institutions that control him so that he is decent and law-abiding, not by nature but by lack of opportunity to be otherwise. He was convinced of the sameness of man's nature as the only permanent factor in a world of flux, and he called for a constraining society (as opposed to a developing, liberal, progressive one) that suited man's constant nature, "his unchanging intellectual, moral, and egotistical qualities which placed him forever outside the Socialist goal of a perfect man in a perfect society."

Hulme's reaction to progressive liberalism had its influence: Eliot's idea of a Christian society owes much to him; his friend Ramiro de Maetzu, once Spain's ambassador to Argentina, died fighting for Franco; Pound's support of Mussolini is well known; Yeats flirted with fascism and Lewis admired Hitler. Yet one feels, perhaps irrationally, that Hulme himself would have opposed modern fascism with his last breath.

A trip to Ravenna, where he was impressed by the Byzantine geometri-

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cal art, drew his interest from philosophy to aesthetics, especially painting and sculpture, and in that area Mr. Jones thinks he did his most satisfying and influential writing. Certainly Epstein embodies much of Hulme's ideal and the cubists to come took the direction he predicted for art. These theories, ranging from poetry to politics, he expounded and explained before a "collection of journalists, artists, Irish yaps, American bums, and labor leaders" who gathered every Tuesday night at the home of his mistress (whose daughter he once promised to marry because she made such "lovely suet puddings").

EVEN in love and war, Hulme was the rebel returning to his roots. He took his pleasure from women coldly and casually and liked to engage his friends with highly imagistic, *avant-garde* reports on "the moral, political and metaphysical implications of the sex act," even when performed on the staircase of the Picadilly Tube. (When he died, says a friend, half the women of London went into mourning, such had been his free-wheeling virility.) Yet later Hulme upheld the Kinder, Küche, Kirche theory and, when he became engaged to marry, apparently remained as continent as a bourgeois swain through months of action in France. During these months, writing under the name of "North Staffs," he contended, like many other Englishmen, that a victory for German military power would spell disaster for Europe; on the other hand, he became an enthusiastic militarist and opponent of pacificism in the *enfant terrible* manner of Charles Maurras.

The volume includes a scholarly edition of the poems, two previously uncollected essays and two letters.

THEATRE

Harold Clurman

EVERYTHING about *Irma La Douce* (Plymouth) is admirably efficient and pleasantly clever: it suffers only from a malady at its core.

I saw it first in the city of its origin, Paris. It had been running for several years and few, if any, of the first company remained. That may be why I was disappointed (everyone had assured me that it was utterly captivating). I saw it again in London in the Peter Brook production which is now here and wrote about it in *The Nation* (Spring of 1958) only to convey the same paradoxical reaction: that while I thought it most deftly directed by Mr. Brook, fetchingly designed by Rolf Gérard, nicely adapted by Julian More, David Heneker and Monty Norman (from the original by Alexandre Breffort and Marguerite Monnot), with a group of notably energetic, versatile and engaging performers headed by Elizabeth Seal, Keith Michell and Clive Revill, I forgot the whole thing almost immediately upon leaving the theatre. The event had evaporated.

"Sweet Irma" (for that, in case you didn't know, is one way of translating the title) might be likened to the pink cotton candy I used to see little girls eating when I was a boy. It was pretty and delicately sugary, but the taste lingered only for an instant.

The malady which besets this Anglo-French concoction is an essential non-existence. It is a sentimental fairy tale which depends on your not for a moment believing in any of it. To illustrate what I mean I should inform you that it is about a *fille de joie*—I cannot in this context use any blunter term—whose *mec*—"guy" or euphemistically "male protector"—is a law student unhappy over his girl's profession. She cannot afford to give it up for lack of what the French call a "serious lover," a man with sufficient funds to support her completely. The law student disguised as a bearded bourgeois undertakes to impersonate the serious lover. He goes to work at a menial job in order to give Irma money enough to turn it over to her protector and "true lover" —himself. The law student is finally not only exhausted by the routine of his masquerade but also becomes "jealous" of his counterpart. The law student murders himself as the bourgeois. He is arrested, etc., etc.

There is an element of fancy in all this which promises the titillation of a frothy dish. But there is no substance anywhere, even if you like the (to me) innocuous music or are taken with the breathless dance numbers or charmed by Elizabeth Seal as Irma. Even in fantasy something must be real. There is nothing sensuous in "Irma," nothing really naughty (though some may find the line-up outside Irma's professional quarters distasteful), nothing wickedly alluring, nothing genuinely witty, nothing authentically Parisian. It is a make-

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believe of a make-believe, a decorated vacuum. A musical comedy of the venereal underworld has been made as anodyne as a tourist poster advertising the enticements of exotic places and people.

A GREAT DEAL of modern English art tends to an ineffable sweetness that often fades to blandness or a vaporous pleasantness. There is a certain solace in it and one can easily become attached to it. Some of the better Old Vic productions of Shakespeare are like this. And the Royal Ballet (Metropolitan Opera House), on a generally much higher level of craftsmanship, sometimes takes on a similar quality. As Stravinsky said of Tschaikowsky's work (apropos of his ballet *Le Baiser de la Fée*) that it was marked by the mysterious imprint of the fatal "fairy's kiss," so the Royal Ballet seldom evokes anything except feminine loveliness, even when it treats of violence or tragedy. One almost yearns for the harsh, the stark, the strenuous, the jagged.

It is nevertheless a pleasure to see *Ondine,* a new ballet in three acts by Frederick Ashton based on the German story of the prince who falls in love with a water sprite and cannot live with or without her.

Beginning with its subject, which is a symbolic drama of the idealist unable to achieve purity while he endeavors to cling to the worldly, all the elements of this opera — except for the score by Hans Henze — are exquisite. With Ashton's finely wrought choreography and Lila de Nobili's enchanting costumes, lighting and remarkably expressive and ingenious scenery, the ballet rises to a climax of aerial delightfulness through the presence of Margot Fonteyn.

She does not dance so much as she wafts across the stage. She does not seem to have a bone in her body, being all spirit. There is no strain or effort, no pyrotechnics, no single virtuoso effect: she radiates a faintly anguished purity — too otherworldly to be named suffering. She floats in a supernal grace which traces no lines clear or sharp enough to be described as curves, arabesques, or anything in the least geometric. She is a weightlessly regal music dimly embodied in frail dance form.

The result of this combination of elements is not so much a great tragic ballet as a most elegant example of *theatre,* a nobly romantic spectacle offering marvelous yet discreet scenic effects — including a storm at sea — with Margot Fonteyn as the supreme vision.

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MUSIC

Lester Trimble

THE New York City Opera Company opened its season with a double bill which, without quite reaching the sublimity it aimed for, was arresting and distinguished. Leopold Stokowski conducted. The two works presented were Monteverdi's *Orfeo* (1607), and *The Prisoner,* a work completed in 1948 by the Italian, Luigi Dallapiccola. The historical and stylistic gap between the two works was about as wide as it could be, but the company's reasons for choosing these particular operas for opening night seemed identical: their intellectual quality and the nobility of their artistic impulse.

To stage an opera by Monteverdi so as to please a modern audience is no easy feat. We are so accustomed to a realistic musical theatre that even Debussy's *Pelléas et Mélisande* languishes in our repertory because it is dramatically static and, to many people, boring. But *Orfeo* is not only static; it is archaic, and abounds in recitatives, the bane of modern audiences. Only Monteverdi's genius for harmonic coloring, for the rhythmic animation of verbal phrases, and for pure melody, stand as buffers against the narrative dullness.

Facing these problems straight on, the New York City Opera made sensible and aesthetically sound decisions. To begin with, the producers shortened the work, bringing it down to ninety minutes. That, to my mind, is a sufficient length for so old a work on a modern stage. Critics who hold that an opera company should restore all the omitted material and give *Orfeo* in its entirety are unassailable as purists, but I doubt they are right in terms of audience response. Their powers of endurance must also be greater than mine. For, despite the beauty of the music in *Orfeo,* I caught myself drifting off more than once in the Underworld scene. If a work is in danger of putting people to sleep, it hardly seems wise to want it longer.

Another excellent decision was made by the debutant stage director, Christopher West, who staged the piece with a good amount of integrated choreography. When this dancing, created by Robert Joffrey, was functioning at its best, it added immensely to the stylish ornateness of the production, and kept the stage picture alive even when the principal singers had little reason to move. In the opening scene, for example, where various groups of singers and dancers spring into life at different moments from a relatively fixed tableau, the dancing functioned extremely well. It was not fussy, nor did it detract from the dignified poignancy of Orfeo's *cantabile* passages.

In the Underworld scene, however, the choreography was unimaginative and repetitive, Donald Oenslager's costumes for the denizens were unattractive, and the stage was poorly lit. Orfeo's long recitatives were thus placed under the increased burden of fighting against the dullness of the visual scene. They naturally lost the battle.

The really glorious spots in *Orfeo* come in its arias, the best of which are entrusted to the title character. Without recourse to visual drama, and with only the element of pure melody to transmit the message, they touch one's heart in a way that no other music quite manages to achieve. There is a peculiar combination of Olympian restraint and humanism in this music which works with tremendous force upon one's feelings. The aria sung by Orfeo after he is in-

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formed of Euridice's death would dissolve a stone.

Gerard Souzay, the young French baritone who made his debut in this role, was in every way admirable. His voice was handsome: supple, and of not too dark a color. And he used it aristocratically, molding phrases and melodies with refinement; achieving the effect of passion not by bleating or wailing, but by simply intensifying the lines laid down by Monteverdi. He is a musician of the finest kind, and ideally suited for the role.

Doris Yarick, who made her debut with the company in the part of La Musica, was similarly appealing: bright to look at and to hear; full of spirit. Judith Raskin (Euridice), Regina Sarfaty (Messaggera), and Frank Porretta (Apollo) also contributed to the evening's distinction.

DALLAPICCOLA'S *The Prisoner* was also having its first performance at the City Center. It was not entirely new to New York, however, having been given previously at the Juilliard School of Music. It is a considerable work, but not great. Though Dallapiccola's craft is enormous, he does not in this opera so much create a dramatic entity as weave a tapestry in which one can admire many individual threads.

The Prisoner is to all intents and purposes a one-character opera, with the protagonist, a tormented, writhing figure, on stage at every moment. Subsidiary characters (the Mother; the Jailer-Inquisitor; two Priests) enter the action only briefly. And with the exception of an instant when the Priests confront the Prisoner, they contribute no element of dramatic energy. *The Prisoner*, therefore, remains a monologue, concerning itself with ideas of dictatorial oppression, religious domination and the deprivation of personal and spiritual liberty. It is adroitly and luxuriously composed, especially for the orchestra. Its idiom, though quite "advanced," is essentially colorful and sweet. But the spectacle of a single character agonizing for the entire length of an opera finally becomes enervating. One loses sympathy and interest.

Dallapiccola has a strange tendency to insert a little bit of jazziness at moments which seem to me quite random and inappropriate. I had the feeling that the composer's pen sometimes raced ahead of his sober thoughts, putting down notes with little consideration of the dramatic situation at hand. I was also bothered by a sentimental little leitmotiv first carefully linked with the words "My Brother!" which was so

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much belabored that it assumed undue importance. Its effect was to cheapen the over-all impression of the piece by letting the listener see all too clearly some of the schematic planning involved.

At the same time, the seriousness of Dallapiccola's subject matter, and the general fastidiousness of his writing (my criticism notwithstanding), made *The Prisoner* worth mounting and hearing. I doubt that it will become part of the basic repertory, but it is a respectable work by a respectable composer.

ART

Fairfield Porter

SO CLOSELY do art and rubbish approach each other in the new exhibition at the Martha Jackson Gallery, and so convincing is the appropriately crowded presentation, like an inventory of the possessions of the Collier brothers, that one wonders where the difference lies. This show, closing October 22, is a tribute to the genius of Marcel Duchamp. Cornell is another ancestor of this movement in which art resembles homemade toys, and in which formal distinctions between painting, sculpture, illustration, satire and the amuseemnt park tend to disappear. The artists use the ordinary materials of this steel, plastic, paper, plaster civilization. Also newspapers, typography, found objects: the jetsam of the city. And paint, in all its forms, from fresh, through peeling, to removed; and dirt, the smear of life. Behind the glass of Cornell's box are loose white cubes in square white holes. No one has improved on his ability to suggest more than is there, as though each of his boxes were a one-act abstract chamber drama.

Brecht's *Play Incident* allows you to drop a ping-pong ball into a choice of holes at the top, when it falls, playing a tune, to come out at any one of five holes at the bottom or sides. Tapies' *Painting on Unfolded Carton* has this artist's gray elegance. Takis uses the entertainment possibilities inherent in magnetism. Kaprow creates part of an environment out of materials of a Japanese flimsiness; and his and Whitman's object, made, as I remember, of a worn-out rope door mat and rag of terry cloth hanging over a pile of crumpled, soiled newspaper, do to space something analogous to what Castro's four-hour speeches do to time. Some artists use their materials pictorially, as Vanderbeek, who bends a bentwood chair into the likeness of a *Seated Figure;* and Jean Follett, whose little figure assembled from switches, springs and castors on a cinder bed is poetically entitled *My Creature Washed up all over the World.* There is the satire of Falkenstein's *Party Line,* with its charred wood and melted insulators; the dadaistic ferocity of Latham's relief of partly burned books opened like flowering pastries from a creamy plaster; and the nightmare of Levinson's lighted sinus operation.

The artists seem to make a visual appeal to ideas too serious for words, even though the meaning derives less from the materials in a sensuous way than through their names. They seem more influenced by the poetry of journalism and of the movies than by what, in this context, I can only claim as the "so-called" plastic arts. The participation of the spectator that Brecht wants makes me think of a host nervous if some parlor game has not been planned for after dinner. He channels the spectator's energy, so that he won't break the furniture. These artists break it first. By their rubbishy, nihilistic look of being against meaning, they concentrate attention all the more narrowly on just this question of what it means.

However, there are several artists in this show who do have plastic concerns; one of them, Indiana, presents a thick, erect plank with stenciled circles and letters, like a signal post considered aesthetically. Another is Paul Harris, shown here, and, much more interestingly, in realistic and abstract examples at the Poindexter Gallery. His realistic sculpture is talented and entertaining like most of the objects at the Jackson Gallery, but his abstract sculptures are very original. Though he has given them titles like *Chandelier of Love, Winter Gladiolas* and *Wishing Well,* which give a dadaistic reference, what counts more is the use he has made of modern plastics as containers for plaster castings. Like many contemporary American sculptors, he is able to make plaster come alive. The sculpture, like broken upholstery, has partly the sensuosity that gives promise of rather uncertain pneumatic bliss, and partly a sick person's sensitivity about the sheets. As in a description of the beauty and intricacy of detail revealed under mescaline, every wrinkle counts. His sculpture doesn't mean anything, but is directly tactile and utterly useless. Through the detail of wrinkle and round object, he goes back to a beginning of sculpture, much as Kline goes back, through the stroke, to a beginning of painting. It seems to me that in his abstractions he has made an insanely inspired jump into significance.

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Crossword Puzzle No. 885

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Its receiver certainly wouldn't consider it free advice. (7, 8)
9 As agent of the spear side, relatively speaking. (7)
10 By rights, shouldn't be a holder. (7)
11 A Manx cat shouldn't be followed. (6)
12 Evidently poor leavings for a hypnotist! (8)
14 Get completely on an even keel, as 10 doesn't hold. (10)
15 Wozzeck was his. (4)
17 Bills might be a jocular title with his. (4)
19 Its members might appear in court frequently. (6, 4)
22 Is an equivalent charge with this not being fixed? (8)
23 Carried along a ring of the island. (6)
25 True marine creature used is pyrotechnics. (7)
26 Period with certain results of rubber application. (7)
27 The final results of cross-checking? (8, 6)

DOWN:

1 Lodge's organization in part, with lines attached for elaborate detail. (7, 3, 5)
2 and 24 down Gaff and net? One shouldn't take off without it! (7, 4)
3 Asks to get out of it when tents are folded. (8)
4 How to examine 3 without getting near. (4)
5 Johnson said knowledge is more than this to force. (10)
6 Are most of the centaurs? (6)
7 Send in a substitute. (7)
8 Do they propose proposals? (8, 7)
13 Does it take very high octane to make one? (10)
16 Sounding like a young male insect? (8)
18 Used to weigh sacks of personal accoutrement? (7)
20 The kind of syne that precedes our troubled weakness. (7)
21 Grubby get-up to dress a marine school! (6)
24 See 2 down

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 884

ACROSS: 1 Radioactivity; 10 Sidecar; 11 At large; 12 Ermined; 13 Scalene; 14 Tenders; 15 Trotski; 16 Immoral; 20 Hotspur; 23 Arraign; 24 Croquet; 25 Lacking; 26 Impasto; 27 Cousins-german. DOWN: 2 Abdomen; 3 Incense; 4 Abrades; 5 Transit; 6 Volcano; 7 Targets; 8 Ascertainable; 9 Deterioration; 17 Morocco; 18 Raisins; 19 Lonigan; 20 Hacking; 21 Trouper; 22 Prussia.

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

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